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ARBITRATION AND FINRA’S CUSTOMER CODE:
A TAILORED APPROACH TO WHEN A FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSE MAY SUPERSEDE FINRA
RULE 12200
Peter Giovine*
This Note examines a circuit split concerning whether forum selection
clauses supersede Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule
12200, which requires FINRA members to arbitrate customer disputes upon
the customer’s request. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth
Circuits have upheld a waiver of the right to arbitrate even when arbitration
is not explicitly mentioned in a forum selection clause. The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, have held that
a forum selection clause that does not explicitly mention arbitration does not
supersede FINRA Rule 12200. This Note explores this circuit split and
advocates for a middle ground between the two approaches, suggesting that
such forum selection clauses should control over FINRA Rule 12200 only for
institutional customers. In such cases, the parties are more likely to
thoroughly negotiate a forum selection clause and intend for it to mean
exactly what it says: that the forum selected in the contract should control.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2018, Adam Ausloos, an investment adviser and owner
of Tax Deferral Trustee Services, LLC, initiated an arbitration before the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 1 against Robert Binkele,
a registered representative of a broker-dealer.2 FINRA’s rules govern
broker-dealers and associated persons like Binkele.3 FINRA rules state that
a customer, which Ausloos claimed to be, is entitled to arbitration at
FINRA’s forum if the customer requests it. 4 However, here, the parties
agreed to a forum selection clause which stated that “any dispute arising out
of” their agreement would be settled elsewhere.5 Binkele did not respond in
an attempt to avoid “submitting to FINRA’s jurisdiction.” 6 When Binkele
sought to enjoin arbitration in federal court, the district court was left with a
choice: either follow the contract and enjoin FINRA arbitration or follow
FINRA rules and allow FINRA arbitration, which would result in a $125,000
default judgment.7 The court chose the former, stating that Binkele would
“suffer irreparable harm” if forced into FINRA arbitration.8
Courts have recently grappled with the question at the center of Binkele v.
Ausloos9: when a broker-dealer’s customer freely signs a contract waiving
FINRA arbitration, should this contract supersede FINRA rules? A circuit
split has emerged around this issue. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits uphold waiver for FINRA arbitration even when
arbitration is not explicitly mentioned.10 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Fourth Circuits have found identical forum selection clauses to not

1. FINRA is a government-authorized nonprofit organization tasked with protecting
investors and safeguarding market interests. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6); Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/corporate-organization/restated-certificateincorporation-financial [https://perma.cc/3F3H-M8Y5] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022); What We
Do, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/3XYW-KK9W] (last
visited Nov. 7, 2022); infra Part I.A.1.
2. See Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *2
(D. Nev. July 16, 2019); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Relief at 3, Centaurus Fin.,
Inc. v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-243, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77680 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2019), ECF
No. 1.
3. See FINRA RULE 12100 (FINRA 2022) (defining “associated person” to include a
person registered under FINRA rules as well as a person “directly or indirectly” controlled by
a FINRA member); id. 12200 (FINRA 2008); What We Do, supra note 1; infra text
accompanying note 43.
4. See Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *4; FINRA RULE 12200.
5. See Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *2.
6. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 2, Binkele
v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368 (D. Nev. July 15, 2019), ECF
No. 5.
7. See Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *7.
8. See id. at *7–8. The preliminary injunction was also granted on the grounds that
Binkele was not acting as an associated person at the time of the contract’s execution. See id.
at *4–5.
9. No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368 (D. Nev. July 16, 2019).
10. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 216 (2d
Cir. 2014); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 754 (9th Cir. 2014).

996

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

constitute waiver of a customer’s arbitration right.11 FINRA, the
self-regulatory organization (SRO) designated by Congress to monitor the
securities industry,12 has weighed in on the side of the Third and Fourth
Circuits through Regulatory Notice 16-25, which asserts that FINRA
members might even face discipline for inserting forum selection clauses into
their agreements with customers.13 Nevertheless, the split persists, with
district courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits following controlling
precedent and allowing waiver.14
This Note advocates for courts to adopt an approach potentially beneficial
to both broker-dealers and their customers by reading forum selection clauses
to waive the customer’s arbitration right only for institutional customers.
This approach would allow broker-dealers to use the more extensive process
provided by litigation in cases like Binkele in which the customer is not a
retail customer, while preserving the right to arbitrate for customers whose
hope for relief is FINRA arbitration.
This Note focuses on the circuit split, discussing the reasoning of the
circuit courts and certain district courts, as well as FINRA’s reaction to the
split.15 Part I describes FINRA arbitration and three lines of cases that set
the stage for the circuit split. Part II utilizes circuit and district court
decisions to discuss the central issues on both sides. Part III argues that
courts should adopt a compromise approach, permitting waiver for
institutional but not retail customers.
I. FINRA, ARBITRATION, AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
This part details background information regarding FINRA, securities
arbitration, and FINRA Rule 12200. Part I.A discusses the statutory and
regulatory landscape of securities arbitration. Then, Part I.B describes three
key issues central to the circuit split that affect whether a court allows waiver.

11. See Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 103 (3d Cir. 2018); UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2013).
12. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA [https://perma.cc/HT7Y659Q] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
13. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 16-25: FORUM SELECTION PROVISIONS INVOLVING
CUSTOMERS, ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND MEMBER FIRMS 1 (2016), https://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/notice_other_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-16-25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7HM-WDXM].
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. The Note focuses on customer disputes and, as a result, does not consider
associated-persons disputes, which do not implicate FINRA Rule 12200, but rather FINRA
Rule 13200 and the Code of Arbitration Procedures for Industry Disputes. See, e.g., Credit
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2016); Barclays Cap. Inc. v. Pair, No.
16-CV-173 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2017). Additionally, although courts have indicated
receptivity to explicit waiver, this Note is focused on the more contentious issue of implicit
waiver that gave rise to the circuit split discussed forthwith. See Reading Health Sys., 900 F.3d
at 104 n.83 (disapproving of implicit waiver but indicating that an explicit waiver’s validity is
an open question); Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328 (noting sufficiently specific waiver is
permissible); infra Part I.B.3 (describing line of cases permitting waiver of FINRA Rule
12200).
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A. Regulatory and Statutory Background
A broker is “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others.”16 A dealer is “any person engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities . . . for such person’s own
account through a broker or otherwise.”17 Brokers and dealers typically are
referred to collectively as “broker-dealers” or “brokerage firms.”18
The securities industry is regulated by a number of federal laws, including
the Securities Exchange Act of 193419 (the “Exchange Act”). The Exchange
Act created the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
empowered it with broad authority over the securities industry, granting the
power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms and securities
SROs,20 including FINRA.21 Under the SEC’s supervision, FINRA writes
and enforces rules governing the activities of brokerage firms, including rules
on dispute resolution.22 FINRA also conducts dispute resolution between
broker-dealers and their customers, governed by the FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (the “Customer Code”).23
FINRA Rule 12200 in the Customer Code establishes the requirements for
when a customer dispute must be arbitrated by FINRA.24
1. FINRA and Its Arbitration Forum
In 2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the
member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New York
Stock Exchange consolidated.25 The resulting organization, FINRA,
regulates almost all broker-dealers.26 FINRA is a government-authorized
nonprofit organization tasked with protecting investors and safeguarding

16. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
17. Id. § 78(c)(a)(5)(A).
18. See Broker-dealer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
20. See Self-Regulatory Organization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining an SRO as a “nongovernmental organization that is statutorily empowered to
regulate its members by adopting and enforcing rules of conduct,” especially “those governing
fair, ethical, and efficient practices”).
21. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/laws-governsecurities-industry [https://perma.cc/AD54-446K] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022). Proposed rules
are submitted to the SEC via notice-and-comment rulemaking. See id.
22. See Paul McCurdy, Philip D. Robben & Genna S. Steinberg, The Uncertain State of
FINRA Arbitration, PRACTICAL L.J. TRANSACTIONS & BUS., Feb. 2015, at 74, 75.
23. See Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/printable-code-arbitration-procedure-12000
[https://perma.cc/834L-75J6] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
24. See FINRA RULE 12200 (FINRA 2008).
25. See Nancy Condon & Herb Perone, News Release, NASD and NYSE Member
Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, FINRA
(July 30, 2007), https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/nasd-and-nysemember-regulation-combine-form-financial-industry [https://perma.cc/4KAD-33QG].
26. See
Statistics,
FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/media-center/statistics
[https://perma.cc/UL9D-B7TS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
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market interests.27 Brokerage firms and their employees must register with
FINRA and, in registering, agree to abide by FINRA rules.28 They are
subject to examination and discipline by FINRA and the SEC.29
FINRA runs the largest securities dispute-resolution forum in the United
States, assisting in the resolution of disputes involving customers, brokerage
firms, and their employees.30 Broker-dealers often contract to resolve
disputes in FINRA’s forum, as the lower expense and efficiency of the
process may be beneficial to customers and broker-dealers alike.31
However, recently, broker-dealers have increasingly opted to settle their
disputes in court32 for several reasons. FINRA’s forum lacks the broad
discovery permitted in court.33 FINRA may decide a case on the basis of
equity or industry custom, which may disadvantage broker-dealers.34
Additionally, there is limited opportunity to appeal even large awards.35
With no written decision unless both parties request one,36 parties may be
left without much guidance about what to do differently in the future. Thus,
while FINRA arbitration provides benefits to both broker-dealers and
customers, there are cases in which resolution in court may be optimal.
However, resolution in court is often subject to a customer’s assent. Under
FINRA Rule 12200, customers have a right to request arbitration at FINRA’s
forum.37 As discussed in greater detail below, FINRA takes the position that
customers do not forfeit that right by signing any agreement with a forum
selection provision specifying another dispute resolution process or
arbitration venue.38

27. See supra note 1.
28. See Application for Membership, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/
rulebooks/corporate-organization/application-membership
[https://perma.cc/E9A5-4XE4]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
29. See FINRA RULE 9211 (FINRA 2018); Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Nonwaivable
Right to Choose Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
383, 384 (2016).
30. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, SECLAW.COM (Jan. 1, 2016, 5:29 PM),
https://www.seclaw.com/glossary/financial-industry-regulatory-authority/
[https://perma.cc/7LZ4-BRQN].
31. See Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Archetypes for Enhancing Access to Justice, 88 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2319, 2327–30 (2020) (detailing reasons why arbitration may be quicker and less
costly).
32. See Kevin Neumar, Arbitration Agreements or Forum Selection Clauses Involving
FINRA Members: Circuit Split Creates Confusion, Increases Investor Skepticism, 17 DUQ.
BUS. L.J. 289, 300 (2015).
33. See FINRA RULE 12506 (FINRA 2017); id. 12507 (FINRA 2017).
34. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law
in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1035–40, 1047 (2002).
35. See STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 78 (2d
Cir. 2011) (noting that courts “will not vacate an award because of ‘a simple error in law or a
failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it’ but only when a party clearly demonstrates
‘that the panel intentionally defied the law’” (quoting Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v.
T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389, 393 (2d Cir. 2003))).
36. See FINRA RULE 12904 (FINRA 2018).
37. See id. 12200 (FINRA 2008).
38. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 1.
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2. FINRA Does Not Condone Inserting an Exclusive Forum Selection
Clause to Prevent Customer-Requested Arbitration
FINRA Rule 12200 of the Customer Code states that “[p]arties must
arbitrate a dispute under the Code” if three conditions are met39: First, parties
must submit to FINRA arbitration if it is either “[r]equired by a written
agreement, or . . . [r]equested by the customer.”40 Second, the dispute must
be “between a customer and a member or associated person of a member.”41
Third, the dispute must “arise[] in connection with the business activities of
the member or associated person.”42 As defined in the Customer Code, an
“associated person” includes “a natural person engaged in the investment
banking or securities business who is directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by a member.”43 “Customer” has a broad definition and includes
those who purchase goods or services from a FINRA member or hold an
account with a FINRA member.44
Further, FINRA Rule 2268 governs predispute arbitration agreements.45
FINRA Rule 2268(d) states that predispute arbitration agreements may not
“limit[] the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration” or “limit[] the
rules of any self-regulatory organization.”46
FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25 draws on these rules to state that,
generally, arbitration must be an option for customers.47 FINRA states that
any denial or limitation of “a customer’s right to request FINRA arbitration,
even if the customer seeks to exercise that right after having agreed to a
forum selection clause specifying a venue other than a FINRA arbitration
forum, would violate FINRA Rules 2268 and 12200.”48 FINRA asserts that,
while courts have held otherwise, FINRA rules control.49
While courts have found that FINRA rules are contractual,50 FINRA, via
Regulatory Notice 16-25, disagrees.51 FINRA states that because the
Exchange Act mandates that most broker-dealers become FINRA members,
and FINRA rules are subject to SEC approval, FINRA rules are binding and
have the force of federal law.52 In support, FINRA relies on Credit Suisse

39. FINRA RULE 12200.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. 12100(w) (FINRA 2022).
44. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 275–76 (2d Cir. 2014); infra
note 128.
45. See FINRA RULE 2268 (FINRA 2011).
46. Id. 2268(d) (FINRA 2011).
47. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 2–3.
48. Id. at 5.
49. See id. at 3, 5, 9 n.11.
50. See infra Part I.B.3.
51. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 3.
52. See id.
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First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald,53 in which the Ninth Circuit held that
SEC-approved NASD arbitration procedures preempted state law.54
Finally, FINRA notes that it views the refusal to grant a customer’s request
for arbitration after inserting a forum selection clause as a violation of
FINRA Rule 2010, which sets forth the standards of commercial honor and
principles of trade.55 Further, FINRA IM-12000 of the Customer Code states
that “fail[ure] to submit a dispute for arbitration under the Code as required
by the Code” could be seen as contravention of the just and equitable
principles of trade.56
A member firm that has an agreement, even if unenforced, that is not in
compliance with FINRA Rule 12200 is in violation of FINRA rules and could
be disciplined.57
Sanctions for noncompliance include “expulsion,
suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure,
being suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any other
fitting sanction.”58 However, it is an “open issue” whether FINRA will
actually discipline members for inserting forum selection clauses in their
contracts.59 A search of the FINRA disciplinary proceedings database turned
up one action for violation of Rule 12200.60 This is the same action
referenced by FINRA in Regulatory Notice 16-2561: Department of
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co.62
Charles Schwab & Company, Inc. (“Schwab”) amended more than 6.8
million agreements with customers to mandate that consumers waive FINRA
arbitrators’ ability to consolidate claims63 despite the fact that the Customer
Code permits such actions.64 FINRA sought to discipline Schwab for
violation of FINRA Rule 2268(d), which, as described above, states that
predispute arbitration agreements cannot limit SRO rules (here, Rule 12200
was limited), and for violation of FINRA Rule 2010 regarding standards of

53. 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
54. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 3 & 9, n.9 (citing Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v.
Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005)).
55. See id. at 5; FINRA RULE 2010 (FINRA 2008) (“A member, in the conduct of its
business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles
of trade.”).
56. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 5 (citing FINRA IM-12000 (FINRA 2008)).
57. See id. FINRA has also stated that firms should review past agreements to ensure
compliance. See id.
58. See 15 U.S.C § 78o-3(b)(7).
59. See McCurdy et al., supra note 22, at 75.
60. This search was conducted on November 6, 2021, using FINRA’s disciplinary actions
database. Terms searched (each in a separate search) included “Rule 12200,” “arbitration
under an arbitration agreement,” and “forum selection.” These searches pull from fields
including case name and document text. See FINRA Disciplinary Actions Online, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/oversight-enforcement/finra-disciplinary-actionsonline [https://perma.cc/9K45-4EHA] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
61. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 10 n.17.
62. No. 2011029760201, 2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr.
24, 2014).
63. See id. at *1.
64. See FINRA RULE 12312(b) (FINRA 2008).
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“commercial honor.”65 Schwab challenged FINRA’s enforcement in federal
court in Charles Schwab & Co. v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
Inc.,66 but the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
stated that the administrative remedies were not exhausted and noted that it
would defer to FINRA and the SEC’s expertise in establishing an underlying
agency record.67 Thereafter, the FINRA board of governors found that the
agreements violated FINRA Rule 2268(d).68 Ultimately, Schwab settled the
matter, agreeing to pay $500,000 and to notify customers of its withdrawal
of the class action waiver.69
B. Three Lines of Cases Central to Circumventing FINRA Arbitration
With the legal framework underlying securities arbitration established,
Part I.B focuses on three lines of cases, which, while not themselves a part
of the circuit split examined in this Note, establish the fundamental principles
that allow waiver of FINRA arbitration. These principles have been
challenged by those who argue waiver is impermissible,70 so it is essential to
describe each line of cases in detail.
1. Waiver of Exchange Act Provisions
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon71 and its progeny allowed
waiver of Exchange Act (and thus SRO) provisions in certain
circumstances.72 FINRA Rule 12200 is an SRO provision, and, as a result,
McMahon has been cited as support for permitting waiver of FINRA Rule
12200 under the Exchange Act.73
In McMahon, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act, which forbids waiver of Exchange Act provisions, “only
prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange
Act.”74 The Court further noted that, although the Exchange Act provides
65. See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063
(N.D. Cal. 2012); supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
66. 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
67. See id. at 1076. This did not constitute deference granted to FINRA Regulatory Notice
16-25, a guidance document which had not yet been promulgated. See FINRA, supra note 13,
at 1 (noting document type as guidance). Courts defer to agency guidance documents under
Kisor v. Wilke, which makes deference contingent on several questions, such as whether the
interpretation creates unfair surprise, was made by the agency, etc. See 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418
(2019). However, deference is irregularly applied to SROs, as they are nongovernmental in
nature and lack direct accountability to the legislative and executive branches. See Emily
Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1757 (2016).
68. See Charles Schwab, 2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5, at *8.
69. See FINRA LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, WAIVER AND CONSENT, NO. 2011029760202,
at 2 (2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/fda_documents/2011029760202_FDA_
D826113%20%282019-1562966372043%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7UD-P3Y4].
70. See infra Part III.B (considering these arguments).
71. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
72. See id. at 228; J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 14-Civ-429, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67135, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2015).
73. See Quinnipiac Univ., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67135, at *12.
74. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
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that disputes would be settled in district court, one does not usually lose
substantive rights by agreeing to arbitrate.75 The question was whether the
agreement “weaken[s] [one’s] ability to recover under the [Exchange]
Act.”76 According to the Court, the SEC maintains authority over arbitration
procedures via the ability to approve or deny SRO rules, including
procedures that “ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect
statutory rights”; therefore, rights were not weakened in the present case.77
Other cases that built on this substantive-procedural distinction followed.78
After McMahon, SRO arbitration increased significantly.79 In 2010, under
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act80 (the
“Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress amended section 29(a) of the Exchange Act to
apply to rules of a “self-regulatory organization.”81 Thus, section 29(a) now
states explicitly that one cannot waive an SRO rule.82 However, courts have
still found FINRA arbitration rules regarding forum to be not substantive and
have thus permitted waiver.83
Even if the Exchange Act permits waiver of forum selection rules, the
presumption of arbitrability—a presumption that a dispute may be resolved
by arbitrators84—if applicable, would effectively mandate reading forum
selection clauses narrowly to not include waiver of arbitration. The next
section discusses when the presumption of arbitrability does not apply.
2. The Presumption of Arbitrability
Granite Rock Co. v. International Board of Teamsters85 and its progeny
established that the presumption of arbitrability does not apply when the

75. See id. at 229–30.
76. Id. at 230 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 432 (1953)).
77. Id. at 234.
78. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(holding that the venue provisions of the Exchange Act are also procedural and not
substantive); Quinnipiac Univ., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67135, at *12–13.
79. See Black & Gross, supra note 34, at 998–1005.
80. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
81. See id. §§ 927, 929T, 124 Stat. at 1852, 1867.
82. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
83. See, e.g., Quinnipiac Univ., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67135, at *10 (quoting section
29(a) as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act in finding that the antiwaiver provision does not
apply to forum selection clauses waiving FINRA Rule 12200); id. at *11 (noting that in
Golden Empire as well, the court implicitly considered the Exchange Act in its decision, since
the parties had raised it in their postargument letters); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy,
No. 14 Civ. 8568, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4428, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015), aff’d, 812
F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2016).
84. Arbitrability refers to “[t]he status, under applicable law, of a dispute’s being or not
being resolvable by arbitrators because of the subject matter.” See Arbitrability, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This includes whether a dispute is “within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.” See id.
85. 561 U.S. 287 (2010).
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existence of an arbitration agreement itself is in question.86 Courts have cited
this line of cases in finding that superseding forum selection clauses implicate
such a question of existence and that, as a result, the presumption of
arbitrability does not apply.87
The Supreme Court has read the Federal Arbitration Act88 (FAA), the
statute governing contracts in interstate commerce containing arbitration
provisions, to articulate a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”89 However, the policy in favor of arbitration “is merely an
acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.’”90 The “first principle
that underscores all . . . arbitration decisions” is that “[a]rbitration is strictly
‘a matter of consent,’ and thus ‘is a way to resolve those disputes—but only
those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.’”91 The
federal policy favoring arbitration does not “override” this principle.92
In determining whether parties intended to arbitrate, courts apply a
presumption of arbitrability furthering the federal policy in favor of
arbitration only if there is a “validly formed” and enforceable arbitration
agreement that is ambiguous as to its scope.93 If it is unclear whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists to begin with, then the presumption of
arbitrability does not apply.94 Additionally, the presumption may be
rebutted.95 When the presumption of arbitrability does not apply, state-law
contract-interpretation rules apply instead.96
In Granite Rock, a concrete-and-buildings company sued for strike-related
damages, and the union sought arbitration regarding the date of ratification
of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.97 Since the
agreement might not have been in place when the unions acted, the
enforceability of the agreement itself was in question. 98 Additionally, the
agreement covered disputes that “arise under” it, and, as a result, the
agreement’s scope did not extend to cover the question of the existence of
86. See id. at 313–14; Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d
522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011).
87. See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210,
215 (2d Cir. 2014); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 744 (9th Cir. 2014).
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15.
89. See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
90. See Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 302 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S 468, 478 (1989)).
91. Id. at 299 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
92. See id. at 302.
93. See id. at 301; Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d
210, 215 (2d Cir. 2014).
94. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2014);
Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011).
95. See Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 301; Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 215.
96. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 742–43.
97. Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 294–95.
98. See id. at 304.
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the arbitration agreement.99 Thus, the Court found that the presumption of
arbitrability did not apply.100
The Second Circuit, in Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital
Markets, LLC,101 took Granite Rock a step further.102 Applied Energetics,
Inc. and a broker-dealer, NewOak Capital Markets, LLC, agreed to NASD
arbitration in a preliminary letter agreement, but also noted that a subsequent,
formal agreement would follow.103 The formal agreement did not mention
arbitration but contained a forum selection clause: “Any dispute arising out
of this Agreement shall be adjudicated in the Supreme Court, New York
County or in the federal district court for the Southern District of New
York.”104 The court cited Granite Rock, and noted that the presumption of
arbitrability did not apply, as the question of whether the later agreement
superseded the former was a question of “whether an agreement to arbitrate
ha[d] been made.”105 Other courts such as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Eleventh and Third Circuits have similarly found that the question of whether
a later agreement supersedes an earlier one is not subject to the presumption
of arbitrability.106 If a court accepts that the presumption of arbitrability does
not apply, the question, then, becomes whether FINRA rules can be
superseded by contract.
3. Contracting Around the SRO Arbitration Right
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits cite the line of cases following Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis 107 in noting that FINRA
arbitration rules can be superseded by contract.108 Thus, this third line of
cases underlying the circuit split is key in determining whether parties can
contract around FINRA Rule 12200.
In Georgiadis, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) constitution stated
that arbitration should take place via the American Arbitration Association,
but a contract between the parties provided for arbitration in other fora.109
The Second Circuit held that the AMEX constitution could be superseded by
a customer agreement that was more specific.110 However, since arbitration
99. See id. at 308.
100. See id. at 313–14.
101. 645 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 2011).
102. See id. at 526.
103. See id. at 523.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 525.
106. See, e.g., Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 255 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he question of
whether a later agreement supersedes a prior arbitration agreement is tantamount to whether
there is [still] an agreement to arbitrate.”); Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111,
1121–22 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the presumption of arbitrability did not apply).
107. 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990).
108. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2014); UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 328 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Goldman, Sachs
& Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (relying on City
of Reno and Carilion Clinic in determining that FINRA Rule 12200 can be superseded).
109. See Georgiadis, 903 F.2d at 111.
110. See id. at 113.
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could proceed in a different forum, the Georgiadis court did not consider
waiver of the right to arbitrate altogether.111
The Second Circuit expounded on Georgiadis in Kidder, Peabody & Co.
v. Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership.112 There, the arbitration clause had been
stricken, and the contract specified that NASD rules governed.113 Section 12
of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure required members to arbitrate if
customers so requested.114 The court acknowledged that contracts for
arbitration could supersede a customer’s SRO arbitration rights.115 However,
it was unnecessary to determine whether complete waiver of the right to
arbitrate was possible because the agreement simply struck the arbitration
clause rather than specifying an alternative forum.116
In Anderson v. Beland (In re American Express Financial Advisors
Securities Litigation),117 the court drew on the finding in Kidder that
“different or additional contractual arrangements for arbitration can
supersede the rights conferred on [a] customer by virtue of [a] broker’s
membership in a self-regulating organization such as [FINRA]” and the logic
of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,118 which noted that
an arbitrator gains power from the parties’ agreement.119 Thus, the court held
that when a party gives up the right to arbitration via settlement, that party
waives the arbitration right under FINRA Rule 12200.120 Complete waiver
of the right to arbitrate was acceptable.121
These cases opened the door for the circuit split. Circuit courts, with some
exceptions detailed below,122 either agreed with these three lines of cases or
remained silent on these issues.123 Nonetheless, the circuit split arose. The
next part details why this happened and describes this split further.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SAME CLAUSE, DIFFERENT READINGS
This circuit split centers around forum selection clauses in agreements
between broker-dealers and customers that do not explicitly preclude
arbitration, but rather say approximately that “all actions and proceedings”

111. See generally id.
112. 41 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 1994).
113. See id. at 862.
114. See id. at 863.
115. See id. at 864.
116. See id.
117. 672 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011).
118. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
119. See In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d at 132–33 (alterations in
original) (quoting Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trs. P’ship, 41 F.3d 861, 864 (2d Cir.
1994)).
120. See id. at 133.
121. See id.
122. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the Third Circuit’s suggestion in Reading Health
System that explicit waiver of the customer’s arbitration right may be impermissible under
section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, and describing the Third Circuit’s reliance on a case that
based its holding on the federal policy favoring arbitration).
123. See, e.g., supra notes 83, 93–96, 108 and accompanying text.
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related to the agreement “shall be brought” in a specified court.124 Part II.A
analyzes the reasoning behind the Third and Fourth Circuits’ findings against
contractual waiver of FINRA arbitration requested by the customer. Part II.B
examines the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits’ findings that the
forum selection clauses in customer agreements may function as a waiver of
a customer’s right to FINRA arbitration. Part II.C discusses the state of the
circuit split today, after the release of FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25.
A. The Third and Fourth Circuits: Forum Selection Clauses Do Not
Constitute Waiver of FINRA Rule 12200
The Third and Fourth Circuits have held that forum selection clauses
covering “all actions and proceedings” are not sufficiently specific to waive
the customer’s arbitration right under FINRA Rule 12200.125 This section
discusses these circuits’ reasonings.
1. The Fourth Circuit: “All Actions and Proceedings” Fails the
“Sufficiently Specific” Test
The Fourth Circuit in UBS Financial Services Inc. v. Carilion Clinic 126
found that a forum selection clause was not sufficiently specific to waive
arbitration.127 Carilion, an entity that runs numerous Virginia hospitals,
contracted with UBS and Citigroup to guide it in structuring bond issues.128
UBS and Citi suggested utilizing auction-rate bonds, and Carilion issued
$234,225,000 worth of auction rate securities (ARS) with UBS and Citi as
broker-dealers.129 In 2008, UBS and Citi no longer issued support bids for
the ARS, and this led bids to fail and interest rates to increase substantially,
costing Carilion millions.130
Carilion’s claims included negligent
misrepresentation, in that it was never told about the custom of support bids,
and Carilion sought FINRA arbitration.131 When Carilion requested FINRA
arbitration,132 UBS and Citi sought an injunction in federal court,133 arguing
124. See Gross, supra note 29, at 387 (describing how these clauses might be inserted as a
choice-of-venue provision on the presupposition that issues would be resolved in court, and
thus the clause would control choice of venue); McCurdy et al., supra note 22, at 77–79.
125. See Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2018);
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2013).
126. 706 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2013).
127. See id. at 328–29. Carilion Clinic also considered whether an issuer is a customer in
this context. See id. at 323–24. Courts define “customer” broadly, and, as a result, issuers
have consistently been found to be customers. See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden
Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 2014); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of
Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2014).
128. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 321.
129. See id. at 321–22. ARS have interest rates that reset at auctions where investors bid,
and the lowest-interest-rate bidder prevails. Id. If the bids do not fully cover the bonds sold,
then the auction fails, and the new interest rate is pegged to the contractual maximum rate. See
City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 736.
130. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 322.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 328.
133. See id. at 322.
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that the forum selection clause in their broker-dealer agreements134 precluded
arbitration.135 They argued that the forum selection clause superseded
FINRA Rule 12200. 136 The clause stated that “all actions and proceedings
arising out of this Agreement . . . shall be brought in the United States
District Court the County of New York.”137
The court described the “sufficiently specific” test—to bypass arbitration,
an agreement must be “sufficiently specific to impute to the contracting
parties the reasonable expectation” that they are superseding or waiving
FINRA Rule 12200’s arbitration right.138 The court found that the agreement
was not specific enough to supersede FINRA Rule 12200.139
In so holding, the court made three main points. First, the court considered
that the agreement stated that “all actions and proceedings arising out of [the
agreement] shall be brought in the United States District Court in the County
of New York.”140 The court noted that if “actions and proceedings”
encompassed arbitration, then this would mean that “arbitration” shall “be
brought” in district court.141 Although it could not be brought in the court
itself, the court would play a part in the arbitration and award.142 Thus, the
phrase could mean that the arbitration would proceed, but the district court
would play a role in these proceedings.143 Second, the court noted that
arbitration was not explicitly mentioned, and if it indeed was so central to the
parties’ desires, one would presume that it would have been explicitly
mentioned.144 Lastly, the court noted that a broad reading of “actions and
proceedings” to include arbitration would make little sense in light of the
134. In Carilion Clinic, City of Reno, and Golden Empire, each issuance was accompanied
by broker-dealer agreements that contained the forum selection provision and underwriter
agreements. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329; City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 736; Goldman,
Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2014).
Additionally, a merger clause stating that the agreement supersedes all prior understandings
strengthened the case for superseding FINRA Rule 12200. See id. at 212–13; City of Reno,
747 F.3d at 750. A merger clause may be helpful, and perhaps necessary, when there is both
an underwriter agreement and broker-dealer agreement, only one of which has a forum
selection clause.
135. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328.
136. See id. at 321.
137. See id. at 328. The clauses at issue in this circuit split all stated that “all actions and
proceedings arising out of [the agreement] shall be brought” in a specified court. See Reading
Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 2018); Golden Empire, 764 F.3d
at 212; City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 736–37; Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329. As asserted below,
minor differences in wording between such clauses should be immaterial. See infra Parts
III.C.1–2.
138. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328 (first citing Anderson v. Beland (In re Am.
Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig.), 672 F.3d 113, 132 (2d Cir. 2011); and then Smith Barney,
Inc. v. Critical Health Sys. of N.C., Inc., 212 F.3d 858, 862 (4th Cir. 2000)).
139. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329–30.
140. See id. (emphasis omitted).
141. See id. (“In whatever way that sentence could be read, it could not be read to preclude
arbitration; to the contrary, it presumes its availability but localizes it, albeit to a forum where
it could not be pursued.”).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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waiver of right to trial by jury.145 The phrase, when used with mention of
“courts” and “jury,” often indicates judicial resolution.146 This, the court
reasoned, was the “natural reading.”147
2. The Third Circuit: Explicit Waiver May Not Be Enforceable
In Reading Health System v. Bear Sterns & Co.,148 the Third Circuit heard
a case similar to Carilion Clinic in which Bear Stearns & Co. (later J.P.
Morgan) served as broker-dealer for Reading Health System’s ARS issuance
of more than $500 million.149 Like in Carilion Clinic, the customer sought
FINRA arbitration and brought claims including negligent misrepresentation
when the broker-dealer stopped issuing support bids in 2008.150 Reading
Health System brought an action for a declaratory judgment to compel J.P.
Morgan to submit to FINRA arbitration.151
The Third Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit and found that a forum
selection clause that covered “actions and proceedings arising out of”
broker-dealer agreements did not cover arbitration.152 The court referenced
the reasoning in Patten Securities Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics,
Inc.,153 a 1987 Third Circuit case that read a forum selection clause with more
permissive language to not waive NASD arbitration rules.154 The court noted
that Patten Securities Corp. was decided based on the FAA’s policy in favor
of arbitration and the principle that a party must know the rights it is
waiving.155 In Reading Health System, the court stated that the forum
selection clause did not explicitly mention arbitration, and thus, it “lack[ed]
the specificity required to advise Reading that it was waiving its affirmative
right to arbitrate.”156 In other words, a forum selection clause referencing
“all actions and proceedings” was not sufficiently specific.
The court also claimed that finding waiver would “deny investors the
benefits of FINRA’s arbitration program.”157 Additionally, the court noted
that it was hesitant to find implied waiver because FINRA Rule 12200 is
“binding” and has been approved by the SEC.158 The Third Circuit went a
step further than the Fourth Circuit did in suggesting that explicit waiver
145. See id.
146. See id. at 330.
147. See id. The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota also has held that a forum
selection clause covering “all actions and proceedings” should not supersede FINRA Rule
12200, citing Carilion Clinic and employing similar reasoning. See UBS Sec. LLC v. Allina
Health Sys., No. 12-2090, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17799, at *17–18 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2013).
148. 900 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018).
149. See id. at 90.
150. See id. at 91 & n.8; Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 322.
151. See Reading Health Sys., 900 F.3d at 90.
152. See id.
153. See 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987).
154. See Reading Health Sys., 900 F.3d at 103.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 103–04, 104 n.82.
158. See id. at 93–94, 103.
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might not be enforceable, either.159 The court explained that section 29(a) of
the Exchange Act may prevent waiver because the statute states that waiver
of “any rule of a self-regulatory organization shall be void,” and cited
Professor Jill I. Gross’s The Customer’s Nonwaivable Right to Choose
Arbitration in the Securities Industry as support.160
3. Professor Jill Gross’s Scholarly Support
Professor Gross, a prolific and accomplished securities scholar and FINRA
arbitrator,161 asserts that, under the statutory framework discussed above,
customer-requested arbitration is indeed mandatory and should not be subject
to waiver.162 In The Customer’s Nonwaivable Right to Choose Arbitration
in the Securities Industry, Professor Gross argues that section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act, the so-called “anti-waiver provision,” applies to FINRA Rule
12200.163 Professor Gross notes that the Dodd-Frank Act altered section
29(a) to apply to SROs.164 As a result, she asserts that “section 29(a) now
explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage agreements that require
customers to waive compliance with FINRA rules, whereas before
Dodd-Frank, the express language of the statute appeared to apply to waivers
of rules of only securities exchanges.”165
Professor Gross acknowledges that McMahon found that section 29(a)
governs only substantive rights and that the language of the case “suggest[s]”
that forum selection is procedural and not a substantive right.166 However,
Professor Gross reads McMahon narrowly, noting that the case only says that
broker-dealers can compel customers to waive litigation rights under section
29(a) and should not be read broadly to permit broker-dealers to waive
arbitration rights as well.167 In McMahon, the Supreme Court did not address
waiver of arbitration rights and whether it would violate section 29(a).168
Professor Gross asserts that the distinction between procedural and
substantive rights is “not talismanic” and, thus, the right to arbitration should

159. See id. at 104 n.83. The court did not make a finding on the issue and noted that it
“need not address whether an explicit waiver of the right to arbitrate would be invalid and
unenforceable under Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.” Id. The court’s caveat in itself is
significant in light of the absence of such discussion from other circuits. See supra Part II.A.1;
infra Part II.B.
160. Reading Health Sys., 900 F.3d at 104 n.83 (emphasis omitted) (first quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a); and then citing Gross, supra note 29, at 388).
161. See
Jill
Gross,
PACE
UNIV.,
https://law.pace.edu/faculty/jill-gross
[https://perma.cc/3Y9R-5849] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
162. See Gross, supra note 29, at 388.
163. See generally id.
164. See id. at 390.
165. See id.; see also Luke Colle, An Investor’s FINRA Rule 12200, 28 PIABA BAR J. 215,
229 & n. 91 (2021) (suggesting that because the Senate report refers to “enforcement issues,”
Congress’s goal was to prevent circumvention of FINRA Rule 12200).
166. See Gross, supra note 29, at 391–92.
167. See id. at 403.
168. See id.
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not be considered a procedural right under McMahon’s exception to section
29(a).169
Professor Gross also notes that according to FINRA arbitration rules, a
member must “execute and file a submission agreement” when filing its
answer to a customer claim.170 These “agreements,” Professor Gross asserts,
are written agreements to arbitrate (i.e., FINRA Rule 12200 cannot be treated
as the written agreement to arbitrate).171 As a result, a forum selection clause
would be the earlier agreement and could not supersede the later agreement
to arbitrate.172
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits: Forum Selection Clauses Constitute
Waiver of FINRA Rule 12200
In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have diverged from the Third
and Fourth Circuits, finding forum selection clauses covering “all actions and
proceedings” to be sufficiently specific.173 However, there is some
agreement between courts on both sides of the circuit split as to the use of
the “sufficiently specific” test and the meaning of “customer.”174 This
section will discuss such issues in detail.
1. The Ninth Circuit: “All Actions and Proceedings” Passes the
“Sufficiently Specific” Test
The Ninth Circuit considered whether a forum selection clause was
sufficiently specific in Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno.175 In 2005
and 2006, Goldman served as underwriter and broker-dealer for $211 million
in ARS for the city of Reno.176 The facts were substantially similar to those
in the Third and Fourth Circuit cases.177 Reno sought FINRA arbitration,
claiming negligent misrepresentation due to Goldman’s failure to notify
Reno that it was placing ARS support bids.178 Goldman responded by suing
for a declaratory judgment that FINRA did not have jurisdiction and sought
an injunction.179 Goldman based its argument on the agreements between
the parties, which contained a forum selection clause covering “all actions
and proceedings.”180

169. See id.
170. See id. at 401.
171. See id. at 400–01.
172. See id. at 401.
173. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 216
(2d Cir. 2014); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 753 (9th Cir. 2014).
174. See infra Part II.B.2.
175. 747 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2014).
176. See id. at 735.
177. See supra Parts II.A.1–2.
178. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 737.
179. See id. at 735–37.
180. See id. at 737.
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The court held that the forum selection clause waived Reno’s arbitration
right.181 In its analysis, the court found that the presumption in favor of
arbitrability did not apply.182 Instead, because the forum selection clause,
like those previously discussed, concerned FINRA rules, the existence of an
arbitration agreement itself was at issue and, thus, the presumption in favor
of arbitrability was inapplicable.183
In interpreting the forum selection clause itself, the court, like the Carilion
Clinic court, employed the “sufficiently specific” test.184 However, unlike
the Carilion Clinic court, which found that the forum selection clause was
not sufficiently specific,185 the City of Reno court found that this almost
identical forum selection clause was specific enough.186 Although the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) do not consider arbitrations to be
“actions” or “proceedings,” the court noted that the CPLR were not
referenced in the contract and, as a result, the CPLR’s definition should not
control.187 Rather, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, state
courts, and FINRA rules themselves refer to arbitrations as “actions” or
“proceedings.”188 This, in the court’s view, outweighed the CPLR’s
reference to “proceedings.”189 The parties did not need to include “any
dispute” to cover arbitration, as “actions and proceedings” could be read just
as broadly.190
The court responded to the Carilion Clinic court’s argument that such a
clause could be read to simply “localize[]” arbitration “to a forum where it
could not be pursued” by stating that, although a federal court may enforce
an arbitration, an arbitration by its very nature takes place outside of court.191
The court also responded to the Carilion Clinic court’s finding that reference
to “jury trial” meant that the phrase “actions and proceedings” excludes
arbitration, where by definition a jury is lacking.192 The circuit court noted

181. See id. at 747.
182. See id. at 743.
183. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.2 (describing the presumption in favor of arbitrability).
The Second Circuit later found the same, employing similar reasoning. See Goldman, Sachs
& Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2014).
184. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 744 (“[F]orum selection clauses need only be sufficiently
specific to impute to the contracting parties the reasonable expectation that they would litigate
any disputes in federal court . . . .”); UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319,
328 (4th Cir. 2013).
185. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328.
186. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 744.
187. See id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 103, 304 (McKinney 2014)).
188. See id. (first citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); then Sacks
v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2011); and then City of New York v. Uniformed
Fire Officers Ass’n, Local 699, 263 A.D.2d 3, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). But see FED. R. CIV.
P. 1 (referring to judicial proceedings as “actions or proceedings”).
189. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 745.
190. See id. at 745 n.4.
191. See id. at 745–46 (quoting UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 329
(4th Cir. 2013)).
192. See id. at 746.
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that there would be a jury in some “actions and proceedings” but not in
others.193
Judge Anthony J. Battaglia, dissenting, raised the possibility of reconciling
FINRA rules with the forum selection clause by permitting arbitration and
later allowing a party to challenge the award in a forum dictated by the
clause.194 However, the court explained that although this “alternative
reading” was possible, the goal of the court is to “effectuate the intent of the
parties,” not presume arbitrability.195
2. The Second Circuit: Furthering the “Plain Meaning” Rationale
Within months of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the Second Circuit held that
a similar forum selection clause superseded FINRA arbitration rules in
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire School Financing Authority.196
Goldman Sachs served as underwriter and broker-dealer over three years for
an approximately $125 million issuance of ARS by the Golden Empire
Schools Financing Authority and Kern High School District (collectively,
“Golden Empire”).197 Golden Empire commenced FINRA arbitration,
alleging that it was fraudulently induced to offer ARS, and Goldman sought
to enjoin the arbitration in federal court.198 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v.
North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency199 centered around similar
issues. North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (NCEMPA) used
Citigroup to underwrite around $223 million in ARS. 200 In 2012, NCEMPA
attempted to subject Citigroup to FINRA arbitration and, in response,
Citigroup brought an action for declaratory relief and injunction.201 In both
cases, the broker-dealer agreements included forum selection clauses
encompassing “all actions and proceedings.”202 The Second Circuit decided
both NCEMPA and Golden Empire in one opinion.203
The Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the
“sufficiently specific” test.204 There was no need for a specific reference to
arbitration, and rather, “all actions and proceedings” was sufficiently specific
to allow the agreement to supersede FINRA Rule 12200.205 The court found
that the plain meaning of “actions and proceedings” included arbitrations as
a type of proceeding.206 FINRA rules themselves refer to arbitrations as
193. See id.
194. See id. at 750 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 746 (majority opinion).
196. 764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014).
197. See id. at 212.
198. See id.
199. No. 13-CV-1703, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188771 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2013).
200. See Golden Empire, 764 F.3d at 213.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 212–13.
203. See id. at 212.
204. See id. at 216.
205. See id. at 215 (citing Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d
522, 525 (2d Cir. 2011)).
206. See id. at 216–17.
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proceedings.207 The court pointed to a number of opinions and the parties’
own filings stating the same.208
The court referred to the Fourth Circuit’s assertion that if “action” covers
arbitration, then arbitration would have to be brought in district court as the
result of a “linguistic trick.”209 The Second Circuit also noted that state
proceedings could not be brought in federal court but fall under “all actions
and proceedings.”210
3. The Southern District of New York’s Rebuttal of Professor Gross’s
Exchange Act Argument: Forum Selection Clauses Are Not Substantive
Provisions
Within a year of Golden Empire, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York applied binding precedent from the Second Circuit in
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC v. Quinnipiac University.211 There, J.P. Morgan
served as underwriter for Quinnipiac’s ARS issuance.212 There was a forum
selection clause covering “all actions and proceedings arising out of this
Broker-Dealer Agreement.”213 J.P. Morgan, like the broker-dealers
previously described, ceased support bids, and Quinnipiac sued for damages
of more than $20 million.214 Quinnipiac raised section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act, noting that it voids any provision waiving compliance with SRO
rules.215 The Southern District noted that the Second Circuit in Golden
Empire had implicitly considered section 29(a) because it was raised by the
parties in that case.216 Even Golden Empire itself had acknowledged that
one could contract around FINRA Rule 12200.217 Additionally, the court
reviewed the issue de novo and found that the Supreme Court in McMahon
noted that section 29(a) “only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations
imposed by the Exchange Act.”218 This was meant to cover an agreement

207. See id. at 217 (citing FINRA RULE 12405 (FINRA 2011)).
208. See id. at 216–17 (first quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985) (referring to “arbitral body conducting a proceeding”); then
citing Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 32 (2d Cir. 2010) (referring to “arbitration proceedings”); then City of New York v.
Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n, Local 854, 263 A.D.2d 3, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (calling
arbitration “the proceeding”); and then N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7505 (McKinney 2014) (referring to
an “arbitration proceeding”)).
209. See id. at 217 (quoting Citigroup v. AllChildren’s Hosp. Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 537, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
210. See id.
211. No. 14-Civ-429, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67135 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2015).
212. See id. at *2.
213. See id. at *2–3.
214. See id. at *4.
215. See id. at *10.
216. See id. at *11.
217. See id.
218. See id. at *12 (quoting Dep’t of Enf’t v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201,
2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5, at *63 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014)).
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that “weaken[s] [a party’s] ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act.”219
Since a rule determining forum is not substantive, the court found that section
29(a) would not preclude the forum selection clause from superseding
FINRA Rule 12200.220 Thus, the court granted a permanent injunction 221
and offered a rebuttal to the section 29(a) argument raised by Professor
Gross.222
C. The State of the Circuit Split Today
This circuit split persists, despite FINRA’s 2016 Regulatory Notice 16-25,
which claimed that the Second and Ninth Circuits were incorrect in their
application of the law.223 In the 2019 case, Binkele, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada rejected FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25, which
had been released several years prior and explicitly denied forum selection
clauses the power to override FINRA Rule 12200.224 The court found that
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in City of Reno was controlling over Regulatory
Notice 16-25 and that the contract superseded FINRA Rule 12200.225 The
court stated that the Ninth Circuit precedent is binding, and “FINRA has no
authority over federal courts in this regard.”226 The court also considered the
importance of freedom of contract.227
In 2020, in New York Bay Capital, LLC v. Cobalt Holdings, Inc.,228 the
Southern District of New York, like the Binkele court, explicitly rejected
FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25.229 The clause at issue stated that “any
action, suit or proceeding” would be settled in the district court.230 The court
noted that the statement in FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25 that FINRA
rules are mandatory does not hold water and noted that, in the Second Circuit,
“a forum selection clause requiring ‘all actions and proceedings’ to be
brought in federal court supersedes an earlier agreement to arbitrate.”231 The
court stated that “[t]he arbitration rules of an industry self-regulatory
organization such as FINRA are interpreted like contract terms.”232 Thus,
the court granted the motion to enjoin FINRA arbitration.233
219. See id. at *12–13 (alterations in original) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987)).
220. See id. at *13.
221. See id. at *15.
222. See supra Part II.A.3.
223. See supra Part I.A.2.
224. See Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *5 n.1
(D. Nev. July 16, 2019); see also supra text accompanying notes 2–9.
225. See Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *5 n.1.
226. Id.
227. See id. at *7.
228. 456 F. Supp. 3d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
229. See id. at 573.
230. See id. at 568.
231. Id. at 572 (quoting Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764
F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2014)).
232. Id. at 569 (quoting Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir.
2014)).
233. See id. at 574–75.
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Later in 2020, in Goldberg v. Bruderman Bros.,234 a New York supreme
court addressed the preemption argument presented by FINRA Regulatory
Notice 16-25, stating that “FINRA is, itself, a creature of federal legislation”
and, as a result, federal courts deserve “substantial deference” when deciding
such matters.235 Thus, the regulatory notice did not control.236
As the split has persisted despite FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25, a
modified approach reconciling both sides of this circuit split is necessary.
Part III will describe such an approach and consider its potential benefits.
III. A MODIFIED APPROACH IS NECESSARY: DECIDE BASED ON THE
CUSTOMER
Courts should adopt an approach beneficial to both broker-dealers and
their customers by reading forum selection clauses to waive the customer’s
arbitration right only when the customer is an institutional customer. Part
III.A describes the proposed approach. Part III.B explores why this approach
is permissible within the current legal framework. Finally, Part III.C
discusses why this approach accommodates the needs of both broker-dealers
and customers.
A. The Proposal: Read Forum Selection Clauses to Waive the Arbitration
Right Only When the Customer Is an Institutional Customer
In cases in which there is a forum selection clause covering “all actions
and proceedings” (or the like) without explicitly mentioning arbitration, the
question is whether the forum selection clause should supersede FINRA Rule
12200. When the dispute involves an institutional customer, then the forum
selection clause should be interpreted as warranting litigation in accordance
with the Second and Ninth Circuits’ holdings. 237 However, when the dispute
involves a retail customer, then the forum selection clause should not be
interpreted to encompass arbitration in accordance with the Third and Fourth
Circuits’ holdings.238

234. No. 159280/2019, 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 1654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2020).
235. See id. at *10 n.7.
236. See id. at *10. Bruderman Bros. and Binkele, unlike New York Bay Capital, LLC and
the circuit court cases discussed above, concerned resolution in another arbitral forum rather
than resolution in court. See Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
225368, at *2 (D. Nev. July 16, 2019); Bruderman Bros., 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 1654, at *2.
However, Binkele claimed that this side of the circuit split was controlling precedent. See
Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *5 n.1. Both cases concern forum selection clauses
that are not explicit and are especially relevant in their responses to FINRA Regulatory Notice
16-25. See id. at *5–6; Bruderman Bros., 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 1654, at *10.
237. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.
2014); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2014); supra Parts
II.B.1–2.
238. See Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Sterns & Co., 900 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018); UBS Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2013); supra Parts II.A.1–2.
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Institutional customers should be defined based on FINRA’s own
definition in FINRA Rule 4512(c).239 This definition is referenced
throughout the FINRA rules to define institutional and retail customers.240
In short, an institutional customer is determined based on a
fifty-million-dollar threshold.241 If an entity or person, “whether a natural
person, corporation, partnership, trust or otherwise,” has total assets of at
least fifty million dollars, then such an entity or person would qualify as an
institutional customer.242 Additionally, regardless of wealth, institutional
customers should include registered investment advisers, banks, savings and
loan associations, insurance companies, and registered investment
companies in accordance with FINRA rules. 243 Retail customers, under such
a definition, are any customers that are not institutional customers.244
FINRA’s fifty-million-dollar threshold is high enough to implicate those
with substantial resources and, thus, those with substantial bargaining power
when compared to broker-dealers.245 These are parties less likely to enter
into adhesion contracts and more likely to freely negotiate, as discussed
below.246 Parties with such wealth are also able to afford going to court.247
FINRA has considered the fifty-million-dollar figure carefully and, for these
reasons, has determined that other monetary benchmarks would not be as
effective.248
FINRA’s definition is also broad enough to include members that can
protect themselves. The “institutional customer” definition encompasses
natural persons and, as a result, very wealthy individuals who likely agreed
to a contract containing a forum selection clause on advice of legal counsel
could not avoid the result of such a clause.249 The definition also includes
parties that may freely negotiate contracts with broker-dealers, such as banks
239. See FINRA RULE 4512(c) (FINRA 2019); see also id. 2111(b) (FINRA 2020). This
approach simply adopts the standard from FINRA Rule 4512(c), which describes institutional
customers’ accounts, and thus should not be limited to those who have accounts with FINRA
members but expanded to those who purchase a “good or service” from FINRA members. See
Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that both groups
are classified as customers under FINRA Rule 12200); FINRA RULE 2210(a)(4) (FINRA
2019) (utilizing the standard from FINRA Rule 4512(c) for institutional investors without
requiring an account).
240. See, e.g., FINRA RULE 2111 (FINRA 2020); id. 2210 (FINRA 2019); id. 2330
(FINRA 2014); id. 2360 (FINRA 2022); id. 4512(c).
241. See id. 4512(c).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. 2210(a)(6) (FINRA 2019).
245. See Gross, supra note 29, at 388 (describing retail investors’ lack of bargaining power
as compared to broker-dealers).
246. See infra Part III.C.2.
247. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 1.
248. See Letter from Joseph P. Savage, Vice President & Couns., Inv. Cos. Regul., FINRA,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, at 7 (Dec. 22, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011-035/finra2011035-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
EAB3-MDHY] (stating that setting the bar higher or lower than fifty million dollars would be
arbitrary).
249. See FINRA RULE 4512(c) (FINRA 2019).
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and many issuers.250 These parties are industry professionals, tend to be
sophisticated and, therefore, are less in need of protections than are retail
customers.251
This approach accords with the general approach advocated by certain
members of the FINRA Dispute Resolution Task Force, which includes
professionals representing both public and private interests.252 In a report,
these members suggested interpreting a forum selection clause to constitute
waiver for sophisticated customers, but not for retail customers.253 The
report did not further clarify what benchmark should be used to distinguish
retail customers from sophisticated customers.254 Sophistication itself can
be an elusive term.255 Wealth has historically served as a rough proxy for
sophistication throughout securities laws.256 Thus, sophisticated and
institutional customers are often referred to synonymously.257 Since there
may be sophisticated retail customers, the task force approximated this
250. See id. Compare Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir.
2014) (describing negotiations between issuer and broker-dealer), with Dep’t of Enf’t
v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5, at *1–2
(FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014) (noting that Schwab amended customer account
agreements for almost seven million customers in their account statements at the end of the
month).
251. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that since parties were
sophisticated, there was no reliance).
252. See FINRA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINRA DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TASK FORCE 1 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-taskforce-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPV5-5WDE]. In UBS Financial Services v. West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc., the Second Circuit rejected an argument that FINRA arbitration
rules do not consider arbitration for sophisticated customers. See 660 F.3d 643, 651–52 (2d
Cir. 2011). However, this Note does not contend that FINRA arbitration rules are not meant
to apply to sophisticated customers. Rather, it asserts that an institutional customer, while
remaining a customer for FINRA purposes, should expect that an agreed-upon forum selection
clause may waive its arbitration right. See infra Part III.C. Thus, FINRA Rule 12200 would
function unchanged, granting institutional and retail customers alike the right to request
arbitration and would only demarcate when it comes to sufficiently specific contractual waiver
such as a forum selection clause.
253. See FINRA, supra note 252, at 49.
254. See id. It is possible that members would approve of the fifty-million-dollar threshold
as, at the time of the report, Regulation BI had yet to be adopted, and, thus, “retail customer”
often referred to those who had not met the fifty-million-dollar threshold. See Dana G.
Fleischman, Stephen P. Wink, Laura N. Ferrell & Deric M. Behar, What Institutional
Broker-Dealers Need to Know About Regulation BI, LATHAM & WATKINS (July 8, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-institutional-broker-dealers-need-86581/
[https://perma.cc/PJ3G-EAR4].
255. See Accredited Investor vs. Sophisticated Investor—Deceptively Similar Terms
with a Huge Difference in Definition, VERIFYINVESTOR.COM (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://blog.verifyinvestor.com/blog/2021/1/29/accredited-investor-vs-sophisticatedinvestor-deceptively-similar-terms-with-a-huge-difference-in-definition
[https://perma.cc/4J96-SPRE].
256. See NATALIE N. WILSON & MICHAEL J. GORBACK, HANSONBRIDGETT, ACCREDITED
INVESTORS: WEALTH IS NO LONGER THE SOLE PROXY FOR FINANCIAL SOPHISTICATION (2020),
https://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/2020-08-27-accredited-investorsalert?pdf=1 [https://perma.cc/E8WW-KCD5].
257. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 29, at 383; Jerry Markham, Protecting the Institutional
Investor—Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 345 (1995)
(“Institutions . . . are often believed to be experienced and ‘sophisticated’ investors.”).
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distinction, too.258 It is possible that the task force referred to retail
customers and institutional customers as defined by the FINRA Customer
Code.259 This Note advocates precisely defining the standard based on the
distinction between institutional and retail customers to avoid potential
confusion.
Using the fifty-million-dollar threshold as a proxy for sophistication is
both over- and under-inclusive, as a wealthy investor may lack
sophistication, and a less wealthy investor may be more sophisticated.260
Additionally, there may not be a major difference between investors with
$49,999,999 and those with $50 million. However, for consistency’s sake,
FINRA draws the line at fifty million dollars.261
Since the
fifty-million-dollar benchmark is widespread and is used to define
institutional customers throughout FINRA rules, investors and regulators
alike will recognize this demarcation.262 Broker-dealers could ensure
compliance without extra cost, as they already monitor which clients meet
the FINRA Rule 4512(c) test in complying with suitability and advertising
rules.263 Additionally, the FINRA Rule 4512(c) test, unlike a test for
sophistication, is relatively clear-cut. It does not require looking into
fact-specific circumstances, but rather calls for analyzing the objective
measures of total assets and status.264 This bright-line approach therefore
makes sense.
Status as a retail customer is likely a stronger benchmark than others. One
could, for example, waive arbitration whenever the amount of the claim met
FINRA Rule 12401’s one-hundred-thousand-dollar requirement, which is
usually used to determine the number of arbitrators.265 “If the amount of a
claim is more than $100,000, exclusive of interest and expenses,”266 the
forum selection clause would supersede FINRA Rule 12200 even if it does
not explicitly mention superseding arbitration.
However, the
one-hundred-thousand-dollar benchmark is quite low and would run the risk
of flooding the courts. Even if the amount was set higher, this approach is
258. See FINRA, supra note 252, at 49.
259. See id.
260. As noted above, the fifty-million-dollar figure is based on parity of bargaining power
between customers and broker-dealers. See supra text accompanying notes 242–43.
261. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-25: PROPOSED CONSOLIDATED FINRA RULES
GOVERNING SUITABILITY AND KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER OBLIGATIONS 5 n.8 (2009),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p118709.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
WA2D-BFBB].
262. See, e.g., FINRA RULE 2111 (FINRA 2020); id. 2210 (FINRA 2019); id. 2330
(FINRA 2014); id. 2360 (FINRA 2022); id. 4512(c) (FINRA 2019). Additionally, the metric
of total assets is commonly used throughout securities law to categorize parties and determine
what rights they are owed. For instance, certain disclosure exemptions to section 5 of the
Exchange Act apply with regard to “accredited investors,” a designation retained based in part
on total assets. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.506; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (defining
the designation of qualified purchaser based in part on the amount owned in investments).
263. See FINRA RULE 2111 (FINRA 2020); id. 2210 (FINRA 2019).
264. See id. 4512(c) (FINRA 2019).
265. See id. 12401(c) (FINRA 2012).
266. See id.
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difficult, as there may be a small claim brought by an institutional customer.
Thus, under this approach, an issuer with in-house counsel could simply
evade enforcement of a forum selection clause by claiming less in damages.
Basing a threshold on the transaction amount in a contract could be
complicated as well. Oftentimes, these transactions span many contracts,267
and thus there would be a question of how to value the transaction.
Additionally, it is possible that a wealthy investor signed a contract with a
broker-dealer for a small amount, fully understanding that the investor would
be subject to litigation rather than arbitration. Thus, the stronger alternative
is to distinguish based on status as a retail customer.
Courts should apply this proposed standard to the cases that come before
them. Additionally, FINRA may find it useful to issue a regulatory notice
adopting such an approach, as this framework would accomplish FINRA’s
goals. With the proposed standard explained, this Note will now discuss the
permissibility of such an approach, and then discuss its potential benefits and
drawbacks.
B. This Approach Is Permissible Within the Current Legal Framework
Essential to the approach advocated in this Note is the ability to supersede
FINRA Rule 12200. Thus, this section will assert that forum selection
clauses can supersede FINRA Rule 12200. In so arguing, this section will
consider the three lines of cases discussed above, describing why waiver of
FINRA Rule 12200 through a forum selection clause falls under such
precedent, and it will also consider some of the major arguments raised by
those who state that forum selection clauses may not supersede FINRA Rule
12200.
1. Waiver of FINRA Rule 12200’s Arbitration Right Is Permissible
Under the Exchange Act
The Exchange Act permits waiver of FINRA Rule 12200. As described
above, the Supreme Court in McMahon held that because Exchange Act
section 29(a) only prohibits waiver of substantive Exchange Act provisions,
and because arbitration agreements do not waive substantive provisions, such
agreements are permissible.268 Like an agreement to arbitrate, an agreement
to waive FINRA Rule 12200 concerns where disputes are to be heard and, as
a result, is procedural and not substantive.269 Forum selection clauses should
not be subject to the antiwaiver rule. Courts have extended McMahon to
forum selection clauses and FINRA Rule 12200 specifically.270
Professor Gross’s scholarship regarding section 29(a)271 is not dispositive.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s application of section 29(a) to SRO rules does not
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See, e.g., supra note 134 (detailing multiple agreements at issue).
See supra text accompanying note 82.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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indicate legislative intent to prevent waiver of FINRA Rule 12200.272 As
Professor Gross herself acknowledges, the “animating purpose” of the
amendment to section 29(a) is “mysterious.”273 The Quinnipiac University
court explicitly quoted section 29(a) as amended by Dodd-Frank in finding
that the antiwaiver provision does not apply to forum selection clauses
waiving FINRA Rule 12200. 274 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act does not
change the holding in McMahon permitting waiver of nonsubstantive
provisions.275
Professor Gross’s narrow reading of McMahon as suggesting that an
agreement can “waive the right to litigate” but not necessarily the right to
arbitrate276 should not control. While the McMahon Court did directly
consider the waiver of the right to litigate, it also allowed waiver of
obligations that are not substantive in nature.277 Professor Gross’s response
on this point, asserting that the substantive-procedural distinction is not
“talismanic” and that courts should instead look to when agreements waive
compliance,278 is too far from the language of McMahon, which states that
“§ 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the
Exchange Act.”279 This language effectively construes section 29(a)’s
compliance obligation as not waiving any substantive obligation.
Additionally, the Court was not focused on formalistic or arbitrary
distinctions between procedural and substantive but rather centered its
inquiry on whether the agreement “weaken[s] [the] ability to recover under
the [Exchange] Act.”280 It is unlikely that litigation, especially in the case of
institutional customers (for whom this Note suggests waiver), would weaken
the ability to recover.281 Courts have read McMahon to allow waiver of

272. See Gross, supra note 29, at 390.
273. See id. Luke Colle, a 2021 J.D. candidate, suggested that because the Senate report
refers to “enforcement issues,” Congress’s goal was to prevent circumvention of FINRA
regulations, see supra note 165, but one cannot extrapolate from such general statements that
a lawful contract would constitute an enforcement issue.
274. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
275. See supra text accompanying note 82.
276. See supra text accompanying note 167.
277. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987). As the
Southern District of New York noted in finding that McMahon did not preclude waiver of
FINRA Rule 12200, forum selection is a procedural issue. See supra text accompanying note
220.
278. See Gross, supra note 29, at 403 (quoting Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 115
(1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
279. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
280. See id. at 230 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 432 (1953)).
281. See J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 14-Civ-429, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67135, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2015); infra Part III.C.2. The Court in McMahon
addressed “suspicion” toward arbitration, see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985)), and, thus, it is
a stretch to read McMahon as permitting agreements that waive Exchange Act provisions to
allow arbitration yet not to allow agreements that waive FINRA provisions to allow litigation.
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FINRA Rule 12200,282 and no court has agreed with Professor Gross’s
argument concerning McMahon.283
Professor Gross argues that based on the policy in favor of arbitration,
waiver should not be allowed.284 However, as explained below, the
presumption of arbitrability is inapplicable in these cases.
2. The Presumption of Arbitrability Does Not Attach
The presumption of arbitrability does not attach to waiver of FINRA Rule
12200. The proposition stated by the Supreme Court in Granite Rock—that
the presumption of arbitrability does not apply when the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate itself is in question—has been applied beyond the
immediate context of labor law; Granite Rock has been applied to securities
arbitration and FINRA Rule 12200 specifically.285
FINRA Rule 12200 constitutes an agreement to arbitrate, but when
modified by a forum selection clause, there is a clear question of whether
there is an agreement to arbitrate in the first place.286 On the one hand, the
forum selection clause could be read to supersede FINRA Rule 12200 and
thus, there would be no agreement to arbitrate. On the other hand, a forum
selection clause (perhaps stating that any litigation goes to a specific forum)
could be read to complement FINRA Rule 12200, and thus, a valid agreement
to arbitrate would exist.287 Since there is a question of the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate, the presumption of arbitrability does not attach.288
The only circuit court that favorably mentioned the presumption of
arbitrability in the context of this circuit split was the Third Circuit in
Reading Health System.289 The Third Circuit referenced the presumption in
the context of Patten Securities Corp., a Third Circuit case decided before
Granite Rock, without specifically applying the presumption to the case
before it and thus did not consider the point in detail.290
282. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
283. But see supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text (stating that the Third Circuit has
considered this argument but not taken it up).
284. See Gross, supra note 29, at 385, 403–04.
285. See supra Part I.B.2.
286. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
287. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2013).
288. See supra Part I.B.2. When the presumption of arbitrability does not attach, courts
employ general state-law contract principles and consider the intent of the parties. See City of
Reno, 747 F.3d at 746.
289. See Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 103 (3d Cir. 2018); see
also UBS Sec. LLC v. Allina Health Sys., No. 12-2090, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17799, at *17,
*19 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2013).
290. See Reading Health Sys., 900 F.3d at 103 (citing Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond
Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 1987)); text accompanying supra
notes 153–55. Additionally, Suleman Malik, in his student note covering this circuit split,
references Supreme Court precedent stating that the presumption of arbitrability would apply
“whether the problem at hand [was] the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” See Suleman Malik, Note, Where
Do We Fight?: A Way To Resolve the Conflict Between a Forum Selection Clause and FINRA
Arbitration Rule 12200, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215, 226 & n.100 (2015) (alteration
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3. Parties Can Contract Around FINRA Rule 12200
A contract can supersede FINRA Rule 12200’s arbitration right. As
described above, the Georgiadis line of cases established that parties can
contract around the right to FINRA arbitration.291 Further, under In re
American Express, complete waiver of FINRA Rule 12200 itself was
acceptable.292 The court noted that a settlement agreement is a contract,293
and, thus, waiver of FINRA Rule 12200’s arbitration obligation is permitted
via contract. However, FINRA, via Regulatory Notice 16-25, states that its
provisions are not contractual but rather have the binding force of federal
law.294
FINRA’s argument is not controlling on this issue. FINRA Regulatory
Notice 16-25 states that “courts that have upheld forum selection clauses
have relied on authority that traces back to two appellate decisions in the
1990s that never actually decided whether a member firm may obtain and
enforce a waiver of its obligation to arbitrate as set forth in FINRA Rule[]
12200.”295 While it is true that the Second Circuit, in the two cases
referenced by FINRA, Georgiadis and Kidder, did not consider complete
waiver under FINRA Rule 12200,296 In re American Express did consider
complete waiver in determining that a settlement agreement could waive
arbitration rights and arrived at this conclusion not solely through reliance on
Kidder.297 The court relied on Kidder for the general principle that “different
or additional contractual arrangements for arbitration can supersede the
rights conferred on [a] customer by [FINRA].”298 The court did not presume
that Kidder stood for the proposition that the arbitration right itself could be
waived. Rather, the court additionally cited the holding in Stolt-Nielsen that
an arbitrator’s power comes from agreement and stated that “it follows” that
FINRA arbitration can be superseded in settlement cases.299 The court
consciously chose to expand on the Kidder holding in applying it to waiver
of FINRA Rule 12200’s arbitration right.300 As a result, when the Carilion
Clinic court referred to In re American Express to state that FINRA Rule

in original) (quoting Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983)). However, this case considered such matters to be questions of scope. See Moses H.
Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). Granite Rock has made it
clear that an agreement must be validly formed and enforceable before the presumption of
arbitrability can apply to such questions of scope. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bd. of
Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301 (2010).
291. See supra Part I.B.3.
292. See Anderson v. Beland (In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig.), 672 F.3d 113,
132–33 (2d Cir. 2011).
293. See id.
294. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 3.
295. See id. at 4, 9 nn.10–11.
296. See supra Part I.B.3.
297. See In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d at 132–33.
298. See id. at 132 (first alteration in original) (quoting Kidder, Peabody & Co. v.
Zinsmeyer Trs. P’ship, 41 F.3d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1994)).
299. See id. at 132–33.
300. See id.
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12200 could be superseded, it was on solid ground.301 Therefore, FINRA’s
assertion that the court assumed that the issue was settled302 appears to be
unwarranted.
Given that this argument regarding the Georgiadis line of cases is flawed,
FINRA’s assertion that a forum selection clause violates the standards of
commercial honor and principles of trade303 should similarly not prevail.
FINRA IM-12000 of the Customer Code states that failure to arbitrate as
“required by the Code” constitutes a violation of the standards of commercial
honor.304 However, if courts hold that the code allows for waiver and does
not require arbitration under these circumstances, then there is a weak case
for finding such a violation.305
A similar provision cited by FINRA, FINRA Rule 2268(d), which states
that “[n]o pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall include any condition
that . . . limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization,”306
is not controlling either. FINRA Rule 2268 only governs predispute
arbitration agreements, which concern resolution via arbitration, and not
forum selection clauses, which concern resolution in court.307 As a result,
FINRA Rule 2268(d) does not control. FINRA Rule 2268(d) originated in
the 1980s with NASD Rule 3110.308 The rule took its current form in
1998.309 Thus, In re American Express and the cases that drew on it allowing
waiver of the arbitration right were decided despite the alleged constraints of
this rule.310
Further, Professor Gross’s argument that a submission agreement executed
and filed as required by FINRA arbitration rules, and not FINRA Rule 12200,
constitutes the agreement to arbitrate311 is contrary to the weight of authority,
301. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 328 (4th Cir. 2013).
302. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 4 & 9 nn.10–11.
303. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
304. See FINRA IM-12000 (FINRA 2008).
305. See id.; Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Mun. Elec. Auth., No. 14 Civ. 2903, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 110511, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2014) (finding forum selection clause
superseded FINRA Rule 12200 and noting IM-12000 does not in itself “preclude[] members
from entering into specific agreements with customers which waive arbitration under the
Code” and that “the only effect of this language is to provide that if the Code requires
arbitration, a failure to arbitrate would be unjust”).
306. See FINRA RULE 2268(d) (FINRA 2011); supra text accompanying note 46.
307. See INTL FCStone Fin. Inc. v. Jacobson, 950 F.3d 491, 503 n.8 (7th Cir. 2020); Reply
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 17, Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87
(3d Cir. 2018) (No. 16-4234), 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR. BRIEFS LEXIS 760, at *19. Further, it
has been asserted that predispute arbitration agreements govern agreements requiring
arbitration, not those that prohibit it. See id. at 19, 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR. BRIEFS LEXIS 760,
at *22.
308. See FINRA RULE 2268(d); SEC Release No. 34-26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144, 21144
(May 16, 1989).
309. See Amendments to Rule 3110(f) Governing Predispute Arbitration Agreements with
Customers, 64 Fed. Reg. 66681 (Nov. 29, 1999).
310. See Anderson v. Beland (In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig.), 672 F.3d 113,
113 (2d Cir. 2011) (dating from 2011); see also Singh v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 219
F. Supp. 3d 549, 560 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding arbitration agreement valid despite violation of
FINRA Rule 2268).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
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as courts on both sides of the circuit split find that FINRA Rule 12200
constitutes an agreement to arbitrate.312 Even assuming that this document
constituted an agreement to arbitrate, a party to a requested arbitration might
refuse to return an executed document (or simply might not answer) and
instead immediately sue in court for a declaratory judgment.313
Although FINRA claims that it may discipline firms for contracting around
FINRA Rule 12200, it is unclear whether firms will actually be disciplined.
FINRA has only chosen to discipline the broker-dealer in one case out of
many concerning forum selection clauses—Charles Schwab.314 The holding
in Charles Schwab was narrow: FINRA may “enforce its existing rules . . .
even when there is a valid predispute arbitration agreement between a firm
and its customers.”315 FINRA’s disciplinary actions are reviewable by the
SEC and the U.S. courts of appeals.316
FINRA’s disciplinary actions themselves likely do not warrant deference.
Courts often defer to agencies based on accountability to the legislative or
executive branches, but SROs are nongovernmental in nature and lack the
same accountability.317 This undermines the rationale for deference, and,
thus, courts often do not defer to SROs.318 The court in Charles Schwab
deferred so that FINRA could make a record, as administrative remedies had
not yet been exhausted.319 As part of this exhaustion process, the case could
be appealed to the SEC, which would then lend its own expertise (or refuse
to hear the appeal, essentially underwriting FINRA’s decision).320 Blurring
the line between the SEC and FINRA only appears rational if the
enforcement proceeding has had a chance to go to the SEC. The Charles
Schwab disciplinary action was not appealed as the company agreed to notify

312. See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 739 n.1 (9th Cir.
2014) (“FINRA Rule 12200 constitutes an ‘agreement in writing’ under the FAA . . . .”); UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 328 (4th Cir. 2013).
313. See, e.g., City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 737 (“In response to Reno’s Statement of Claim,
Goldman filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking
a declaratory judgment that FINRA lacks jurisdiction over the dispute.”).
314. See Dep’t of Enf’t v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 FINRA
Discip. LEXIS 5 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014); supra text accompanying notes
60–69. This case was particularly notable because the broker-dealer amended millions of
agreements. See supra text accompanying note 63.
315. See Charles Schwab, 2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5, at *73 (emphasis added).
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d).
317. See Hammond, supra note 67, at 1709.
318. See, e.g., N.Y. Bay Cap., LLC v. Cobalt Holdings, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 3d 564, 573–74
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Drzayick, No. 11-CV-00126, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129366, at *5 n.1 (D. Idaho Nov. 8, 2011) (explicitly refraining from applying
deference to FINRA director’s previous decisions). While a number of other courts have
granted deference to SROs, such deference is often not dispositive. See, e.g., Heath v. SEC,
586 F.3d 122, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “dispositive deference” was not given to
NYSE’s regulation arm or the SEC); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 382 (1st Cir. 1971)
(noting that federal courts have leeway to overrule exchange interpretations).
319. See supra text accompanying note 67.
320. See Charles Schwab v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
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its customers and pay a fine.321 Thus, it is difficult to tell whether a
disciplinary action from FINRA appealed to the SEC would hold up.322
For similar reasons, FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25 itself should not be
accorded deference. The court in Charles Schwab considered FINRA’s
formal adjudication, not a guidance document (in fact, the guidance
document was promulgated years later).323 FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25
was not subject to review by the SEC but took effect upon filing,324 thus
similarly undermining the argument for deference, as there is a lack of
accountability to the legislature or executive. It is notable that, although one
of the parties in Reading Health System cited this case to argue for deference,
the Third Circuit did not similarly defer.325 In fact, no court that has
considered Regulatory Notice 16-25 has given FINRA’s interpretation
deference.326 As described above, courts have repeatedly chosen not to let
Regulatory Notice 16-25 upend binding circuit court precedent.327
Assuming arguendo that FINRA was treated like the SEC and accorded
deference, the document at issue is a guidance document, and, recently, the
Supreme Court narrowed deference for guidance documents in Kisor v.
Wilke.328 For instance, to receive deference under Kisor, the interpretation
321. See FINRA LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, WAIVER AND CONSENT, supra note 69, at 2;
supra text accompanying note 69.
322. See Singh v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 549, 559 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(criticizing the decision in Charles Schwab and noting the lack of appeal).
323. See Charles Schwab, 861 F. Supp. at 1065; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (describing
review process for FINRA’s disciplinary actions).
324. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A); FINRA, supra note 13, at 1 (designating notice type as
guidance); Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 307, at 21, 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR.
BRIEFS LEXIS 760, at *24 (stating that there is “no contention that Regulatory Notice 16-25
bears an agency’s imprimatur”). Although the Reading Health System court noted that FINRA
Rule 12200 was approved by the SEC, see supra text accompanying note 158, the SEC’s lack
of approval for FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25 is the more relevant consideration because
FINRA Rule 12200 alone could be read to permit waiver, see supra Part III.B.
325. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 15 n.7, Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
900 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018) (No. 16-4234), 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR. BRIEFS LEXIS 474, at *55
n.7.
326. See, e.g., Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 102 n.73 (3d Cir.
2018) (citing Regulatory Notice 16-25 but declining to accord any special deference to it);
N.Y. Bay Cap., LLC v. Cobalt Holdings, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 3d 564, 572–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2020);
Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *5 n.1 (D. Nev. July
16, 2019); Goldberg v. Bruderman Bros., No. 159280/2019, 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 1654, at *10
n.7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2020).
327. See supra Part II.C. Although National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services allowed granting agency deference in the face of conflicting court opinions
if a court notes that a statute is ambiguous, this case is inapplicable, as Regulatory Notice
16-25 is a guidance document promulgated by an SRO, not a regulation promulgated by an
agency. See 545 U.S. 967, 980, 996 (2005). Thus, courts were on solid ground when they
followed binding circuit precedent instead of following Regulatory Notice 16-25. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying note 226.
328. See 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2449 (2019); supra note 67. Some have suggested that Kisor
deference (or, before that regime was articulated, its forebearer, deference under Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)) might apply to FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25. See, e.g.,
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 325, at 16, 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR. BRIEFS LEXIS 474,
at *16–17; Colle, supra note 165, at 234. However, courts have not taken up these arguments
and have refrained from granting deference. See supra note 326.
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may not (among other criteria) create “unfair surprise” by changing
established industry practice.329 Here, the guidance document demands that
parties review all past agreements and purge them of any offending
clauses,330 thereby upending established practices. Additionally, an
interpretation must be “actually made by the agency,”331 and an
interpretation by FINRA is not an interpretation by the SEC, the “agency” in
this situation.332 Application of Kisor is especially tenuous because
deference is often not given in many deference-eligible cases.333
FINRA similarly notes that FINRA rules have the force of federal law,
citing Grunwald in support of this proposition. 334 The court in Grunwald
held that the Exchange Act preempts California’s ethics standards and that
SEC-approved NASD arbitration procedures controlled.335 However, since
FINRA Rule 12200 is ambiguous, the provision prohibiting waiver is FINRA
Regulatory Notice 16-25, which is a guidance document that took effect on
filing and, unlike the procedures in Grunwald, was not subject to searching
SEC review.336 This undermines the potential preemptive effect of
Regulatory Notice 16-25. Additionally, FINRA extrapolates that, as a result
of their binding nature, FINRA rules are not contracts.337 However, in no
way did Grunwald prohibit contractual waiver or state that FINRA
arbitration rules could not be contractual in nature.338 Grunwald was a Ninth
Circuit case, and the Ninth Circuit itself after Grunwald has held that FINRA
arbitration rules were contractual and could be waived.339 As a result,
Grunwald is not controlling in this situation.340

329. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551
U.S. 158, 170 (2007)).
330. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 5.
331. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
332. See supra note 67.
333. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2010) (asserting that deference regimes are applied like canons
rather than as precedent).
334. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 3 & 9 n.9 (citing Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v.
Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005)).
335. See Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005).
336. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. Additionally, any preemptive effect on
state law would not foreclose the ability of courts to interpret FINRA provisions. See Goldberg
v. Bruderman Bros., 159280/2019, 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 1654, at *10 n.7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
20, 2020) (emphasizing that federal courts are “especially deserving of substantial deference”
concerning waiver of FINRA Rule 12200 because “FINRA is, itself, a creature of federal
legislation”).
337. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 3 & 9 n.9.
338. See generally Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119.
339. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 739 n.1, 741 (9th Cir.
2014).
340. Cf. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 38, Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812
F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-0345-cv), ECF No. 89 (“[N]othing in Grunwald has anything
to do with . . . any private arbitration agreement of any kind, nor does the case hold that NASD
(now FINRA) rules constitute congressional action . . . .”).
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All circuits that have thus far ruled on this issue agree that FINRA Rule
12200 can be waived if indeed there is a sufficiently specific agreement.341
Such consensus among the courts, including courts on both sides of the
circuit split,342 lends perhaps the strongest support for this Note’s contention
that FINRA Rule 12200 may be read as a contractual provision.
C. This Approach Sensibly Accommodates Both Sides’ Needs
In determining whether a forum selection clause is viable, courts look to
“effectuate the intent of the parties.”343 The forum selection clauses in cases
in which the customer is institutional are sufficiently specific. One must be
able “to impute to the contracting parties the reasonable expectation that they
are superseding, displacing, or waiving the arbitration obligation created by
FINRA Rule 12200.”344 It is far easier to impute such an expectation to an
institutional customer, which is more likely to hire outside or in-house
counsel.345 An institutional customer may be more likely to view a provision
as all-inclusive and mandatory, the hallmarks of a sufficiently specific
provision.346 Thus, the same forum selection clause may be sufficiently
specific for institutional customers but not sufficiently specific for retail
customers.
1. A Forum Selection Clause May Not Be Sufficiently Specific for
Retail Customers
Forum selection clauses that do not explicitly mention arbitration and
involve a retail customer should be found not to be sufficiently specific. This
is sensible because retail customers generally might not consider the
implications of leaving out important terms. Even a retail customer with

341. See INTL FCStone Fin. Inc. v. Jacobson, 950 F.3d 491, 503 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“Although we express no opinion on the merits of this issue, among the circuits that have, the
obligation to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200 can be superseded or waived by specific
agreement of the parties.”).
342. See, e.g., Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 90, 102–03 (3d
Cir. 2018); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014); UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 328 (4th Cir. 2013); Anderson v. Beland
(In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig.), 672 F.3d 113, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
343. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 746.
344. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328.
345. See Teri J. Dobbins, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Barriers to Justice in the Law
of Contracts, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 116, 116 (2005) (describing how access to counsel is unequal and
that this can have a “particular significance in the law of contracts”).
346. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 328; Applied Energetics Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Mkts.,
LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 2011). This approach is in line with the modified objective
approach to contract interpretation, the majority approach employed by courts and advocated
for by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which dictates that when both parties attach
different meanings to a term and one party knew or had reason to know of the meaning of
another, that latter party’s construction prevails. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 201 (AM. L. INST. 1981); 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.5 (2021); Randy E. Barnett,
Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 629 (2002).
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some sophistication might not have the resources or awareness to hire
counsel knowledgeable in relevant matters.347
Retail customers may read the term “actions and proceedings” in different
ways. For instance, the CPLR do not consider arbitration as an action or
proceeding.348 Retail customers might also be thrown by mention of terms
like “judge” and “jury,” which the Fourth Circuit noted were terms indicative
of litigation and thus, not preclusive of arbitrability.349 Forum selection
clauses may contain such language concerning judicial proceedings, and this
is especially likely to evoke litigation, rather than arbitration, in a retail
customer’s mind. As a result, the specific may, in these cases, limit the
general.350 It is unlikely that retail customers would be able to determine the
meaning of such clauses when courts themselves are split, or that retail
customers would research whether such a split exists.
Additionally, in these cases, the broker-dealer is almost invariably the
drafter of the agreement.351 A retail customer will not be drafting these
agreements and, based on the contractual principle of construction against
the drafter, the construction should be in favor of the retail customer.352
Construction against the drafter dictates that the forum selection clause in
covering “all actions and proceedings” does not waive the right to arbitration.
As a result, it is sensible to presume that when a party is a retail customer, it
does not have reason to know that “all actions and proceedings” could
include arbitration, and thus it could not waive its arbitration right.

347. Additionally, in practice, retail customers are often not negotiating contracts. See, e.g.,
Webb v. First Tenn. Brokerage, No. E2012-00934-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS
396, at *18 (Ct. App. June 18, 2013) (noting retail customer had contract presented on
“take-it-or-leave-it basis”); Dep’t of Enf’t v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201,
2014 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5, at *69 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014) (noting that
Schwab amended customer agreements for almost seven million customers in their account
statements at the end of the month, abridging arbitrators’ ability to consolidate claims and
thus, the ability to arbitrate “under the Code” provided by FINRA Rule 12200). However,
even if a retail customer has the ability to negotiate, retail customers are still due protection as
a group because of their reasonable expectations.
348. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 103, 304 (McKinney 2022).
349. See Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 329–30. While this Note does not assert that terms
like “judge” and “jury” must be present in a forum selection clause to trigger FINRA Rule
12200’s protections for retail customers, their use serves as an example of language that may
confuse retail customers.
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400,
407 (3d Cir. 1987); Defendant’s Cross-Motion to Enjoin the Arbitration at 20, Reading Health
Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., No. 15-cv-01412 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2016), ECF No. 19 (arguing
that defendant broker-dealer drafted and inserted the forum selection clause, and thus
construction against the drafter should apply).
352. To the extent that such terms are boilerplate, this furthers the argument for use of
construction against the drafter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 1981) (noting that construction against the drafter is often applied to
standardized contracts and in cases where there is a disparity in bargaining power).
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2. A Forum Selection Clause May Be Sufficiently Specific for
Institutional Customers
Since an institutional customer has reason to know (or a reasonable
expectation) that the meaning of a forum selection clause encompassing “all
actions and proceedings” could include arbitration, it is sensible to interpret
that clause as including arbitration. An institutional customer likely was
advised by counsel well-informed about securities regulations and the
customer’s arbitration right.353
First, an institutional customer, via counsel, has the ability to weigh the
significance of the many sources that use the term “actions or
proceedings”354 to refer to arbitration. As noted in City of Reno, the Supreme
Court “routinely refer[s] to arbitrations as ‘actions’ or ‘proceedings.’”355
Those familiar with securities law would be more likely to know that the
FINRA rules themselves refer to arbitrations as “actions” or
“proceedings.”356 And, of course, if such a bright-line rule were adopted,
going forward, such parties would be aware of the rule.
Looking to context, if words such as “jury” are used, an institutional
customer or its counsel is more likely to read with nuance. As the Ninth
Circuit noted in response to the use of words such as “jury,” there would be
a jury in some actions but not in others.357 An institutional customer’s
counsel reviewing a forum selection clause might notice that “all actions and
proceedings” includes those that do not involve a jury (as not even all
litigation does).
Further, City of Reno effectively counters Carilion Clinic’s finding that if
“all actions and proceedings” is read to include arbitrations, then it
effectively means arbitration shall be brought in court and therefore is
illogical.358 Arbitration falls under the “broad umbrella” of “actions and
proceedings.”359 Thus, the dispute, as an action or proceeding, must be
brought in district court, but not as an arbitration.360 Nothing in a forum
selection clause says that the dispute must keep its form. Rather, the dispute
would be brought in district court as a judicial action.361 Additionally, as the
Golden Empire court noted, some cases in state court, much like arbitrations,

353. See Dobbins, supra note 345, at 116. Luke Colle argues that customers have a
reasonable expectation of arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200, due in large part to how
routine arbitration has become. See Colle, supra note 165, at 243–44. However, institutional
customers that have agreed to settle “all actions and proceedings” in court likely do not have
such an expectation, as they know that they have agreed to something other than what is
routine. Cf. Dobbins, supra note 345, at 116.
354. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
355. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 744 (9th Cir. 2014).
356. See id. at 744–45.
357. See id. at 746.
358. See id. at 745.
359. See id. at 746.
360. See id. at 745–46, 745 n.6.
361. See id. at 746.
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cannot be “brought” in federal court.362 Yet, it is well known that such forum
selection clauses mandate bringing such disputes in federal court.363
Therefore, in context, it is logical for “actions and proceedings” to be read to
include arbitration.
One could, as the dissent in City of Reno suggested, reconcile forum
selection clauses and FINRA rules by permitting arbitration and then
allowing a party to challenge the award in a forum dictated by the clause.364
However, awards are only vacated for intentional defiance of the law,365 and,
thus, under the dissent’s approach, the forum selection clause would have
little, if any, practical effect. It is unlikely that parties would intend such an
absence of effect. As the majority in City of Reno noted, state contract law
governs, and the goal is to effectuate the reasonable expectation of the parties
and not to presume arbitration.366
In cases in which the customer is an institutional customer, construction
against the drafter is not applicable.367 The broker-dealer and customer are
close in bargaining power, and both agreed via contract to supersede their
default obligation to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200. This approach thus
avoids forcing arbitration when there is a superseding agreement removing
consent.
3. Policy Implications
This approach would serve as a middle ground of sorts between the two
sides of the circuit split. As such, it would accomplish investor-protection
goals inherent in the Third and Fourth Circuits’ approach,368 while
simultaneously accomplishing freedom-of-contract goals inherent in the
Second and Ninth Circuits’ approach.369
FINRA notes two policy reasons behind providing arbitration as an option,
regardless of forum selection clauses: investor protection and market
integrity.370 In terms of investor protection, this approach will protect those
who need it most. As described above, a retail customer may be less likely
to read an implicit provision covering all “actions and proceedings” to
include arbitration.371 Additionally, FINRA has noted that without access to
362. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 217 (2d
Cir. 2014).
363. See id.
364. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 750 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
365. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
366. See City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 743–44, 746.
367. See Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905–06 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that
construction against the drafter does not apply when the parties are equally sophisticated).
368. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 4.
369. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Schs. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 216 (2d
Cir. 2014); City of Reno, 747 F.3d at 746 (discussing the importance of giving the parties the
contract they bargained for); see also Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 225368, at *7 (D. Nev. July 16, 2019) (discussing freedom-of-contract concerns to
justify allowing contract to supersede FINRA Rule 12200).
370. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 2.
371. See supra Part III.C.1.
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FINRA’s forum, customers may be unable “as a practical matter” to bring
claims at all, “particularly small claims,” due to expense and the complicated
nature of the proceedings.372 This approach will protect such retail
customers by preserving their right to pursue FINRA arbitration despite
alleged contractual waiver.
At the same time, this approach will preserve market integrity by sending
institutional customers to litigation. Parties in court are granted more
opportunity for discovery,373 and, while avoiding flooding courts with small
claims, this approach would allow for greater discovery in transactions like
those in Carilion Clinic.374 Institutional customers should be subject to such
discovery if the broker-dealer so wishes, as they are more likely to have a
vast trove of relevant materials.375 These materials may vindicate the
broker-dealer. Conversely, expanded discovery may reveal a broker-dealer’s
mismanagement, benefitting the institutional customer. As a result, overall,
expanded discovery will allow devotion of time and resources to large
matters, allowing only meritorious claims to proceed. The use of extra
resources is warranted, as these claims are often high stakes and may have a
large economic effect. Ability to appeal such awards would serve as another
check on the process.376 Avoidance of decisions in equity would lead to more
predictable findings.377
This approach will also protect freedom of contract. If an institutional
customer truly wishes to contract away its right to demand arbitration, it can.
Ability to negotiate a forum selection clause may be a more serious concern
in a large transaction involving an institutional customer.378 Liabilities from
such a transaction are likely greater, and thus a party may wish to ensure
access to courts. By disallowing the ability to contract away one’s right to
request arbitration entirely, the institutional customer is hurt because it loses
a powerful bargaining chip. Parties may possibly forgo certain transactions
altogether.379

372. See FINRA, supra note 13, at 4.
373. See McCurdy et al., supra note 22, at 77.
374. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319, 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2013)
(describing transaction for $234 million in auction-rate bonds and millions of dollars in
losses).
375. See, e.g., Rangarajan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 917 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2019)
(noting tens of thousands of emails provided by large organization during discovery);
Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bock, No. 10-24157-MC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7455, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2013) (noting thousands of emails to be released by Citigroup during
discovery).
376. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
377. See Black & Gross, supra note 34, at 1047.
378. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (describing how institutional customers
are more likely than retail customers to negotiate such contracts).
379. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 66 (2013) (noting that a
forum selection clause may “have been a critical factor in [the parties’] agreement to do
business together in the first place”); Brief for Defendant-Appellant and Joint Appendix:
Volume I of II at 22, Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018)
(No. 16-4234), 2017 U.S. 3RD CIR. BRIEFS LEXIS 284, at *27.
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Thus, such an approach would allay fears of reduced confidence in the
SRO arbitration system.380 It would build trust in the system by allowing it
to function efficiently and meaningfully serve those who need it most.
CONCLUSION
In Binkele, Ausloos, the claimant, was a sophisticated investment
adviser.381 Both Ausloos and Binkele maintained significant businesses and
contracted to waive FINRA arbitration.382 The approach described herein
would prevent situations in which those like Binkele, who contract with a
sophisticated party, invoke an agreed-upon forum selection clause to no avail
and incur a sizable default judgment by relying on that contract.
Courts should read forum selection clauses that cover “all actions and
proceedings” or contain similar language to waive the customer’s arbitration
right only when the customer is an institutional customer. This approach is
consistent with underlying case law. Under McMahon, FINRA Rule 12200
should be read to implicate procedural rather than substantive rights and, as
a result, this approach does not contravene the Exchange Act’s mandate that
one cannot waive an SRO rule.383 Additionally, under Granite Rock, since
the existence of an agreement to arbitrate itself is in question in these
situations, the presumption of arbitrability does not apply, and thus, state-law
contract rules, which emphasize giving the parties the bargain they intended
to strike, predominate.384 Finally, under In re American Express and its
progeny, contracts can supersede FINRA Rule 12200.385 Institutional
customers likely intended to bargain to settle their disputes in court, while
retail customers may not have reviewed such a clause with an awareness of
its consequences.
This approach is a middle ground between the divergent circuits: it
protects retail customers while at the same time maintaining freedom of
contract for institutional customers. Such an approach would protect
broker-dealers from large awards that are unappealable and decided on the
basis of equity, potentially ensuring the survival of the broker-dealer’s
business. Additionally, preserving retail customers’ arbitration right may
protect them from losing their life savings and ensure affordable access to a
tribunal. This Note urges action from the courts in accordance with the
proposal set forth herein to protect broker-dealers and the customers they
serve.

380. See Gross, supra note 29, at 402.
381. See Binkele v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-01079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *2
(D. Nev. July 16, 2019); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Relief at 3, Centaurus Fin.,
Inc. v. Ausloos, No. 19-cv-243, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77680 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2019), ECF
No. 1.
382. See Binkele, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225368, at *2.
383. See supra Part III.B.1.
384. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (AM. L. INST. 1981); supra Part
III.B.2.
385. See supra Part III.B.3.

